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WHEELING THROUGH ROUGH TERRAIN
- THE LEGAL ROADBLOCKS OF
DISABLED ACCESS IN SPORTS
ARENAS
MARK A. CONRAD*
Imagine the trip to your seat at a sports arena or stadium. Although
you have arrived at the gate, the sojourn is far from over. The car is
parked, the tickets are ready and you have just entered. What is left is to
negotiate through the ramps, escalators and stairs. The distance can be
measured in hundreds of feet, if the seats are found in the lower-num-
bered sections, and hundreds of yards, if your seats are in the higher
sections. In any event, more than a few steps of walking are involved.
The trip to your seat involves walking up three steep ramps to get to
the "loge" level. Upon reaching the loge level you find the entrance to
your seat section. Upon entering, you see a flight of twenty descending
steps. You gingerly walk down, arrive at the correct row and look for
your seat. Upon calculating that your seat is the eighth seat inside, you
tiptoe gingerly through seven seated patrons (since you arrived just three
minutes before the beginning of the match). After journeying the
equivalent of a quarter mile from the parking lot to your seat, you fall
into your seat and relax. That is until nature calls, and you need to take a
trip to the bathroom - and backtracking through the seven bodies, and
up the twenty steps and about 200 feet in the hallway until you reach the
location. Later in the game, your accompanying son or daughter must
have that pizza or hot dog. With nary a vender to be found, you again
ascend, turn right into the corridor, wait in line for five minutes to get
the goodies, and descend to the seat once more.
Now that the walking is over, it is time for setting your eyes on the
game at hand. A close contest against the most hated rival, you enjoy the
excitement and the adrenaline is flowing. Every few minutes, a heart-
stopping moment approaches. Whether it is a home run, interception,
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goal or basket, you and many around you have the natural inclination to
stand up during these moments. Whether it is the heat of emotion, the
need to get a better view of the activities, or just participating in the
"wave," the process of standing comes naturally.
But suppose that there is a problem. A major problem. You cannot
get out of your seat. Nor can you walk those steps. Nor ascend and de-
scend down the ramp. In fact, you cannot even get into the stadium or
arena. Due to accident or disease, your legs are immobile or badly weak-
ened. As a result, you are wheelchair bound.
In most stadiums or arenas, you cannot easily get up the ramp to get
to your section, to then climb down the stairs to get into your row. If you
are a sports fan who happens to be disabled, often your best bet is to stay
home and watch the match on television as you literally cannot get past
the stadium or arena entrance without some degree of facility.
It is no secret that going to sporting events has been a pastime for
those who have the ability to walk on their own two feet. Unfortunately,
people with difficulty walking or standing have not been able to frequent
baseball, football, basketball, hockey, or just about any organized event
in a standard sports stadium or arena.
The modern-day sports stadium or arena began after the First World
War. Larger than its predecessors with the capacity to seat tens of
thousands of fans, it had several levels, narrow stairs, and tight seating.
The same can be said for indoor arenas, which also gained prominence in
the 1920s and 1930s when refrigerated ice surfaces originated and more
winter events could be staged. Many fans took advantage of these larger
facilities. But not the disabled.
Of course, the disabled were relegated to the margins of our society
in more direct ways. Lack of employment, transportation and the like.
But if so many analogize sports with society, this analogy proves espe-
cially apt in our hypothetical. The marginalized disabled cannot enjoy
the tribal rituals of a sports event.
The more recent improvements like elevators and escalators do not
necessarily solve the problem. The disabled patron still has to find his or
her way to the particular seat. And as our hypothetical noted, even if the
patron is seated, what happens if the fans in front of him or her stand up
for a goal, or a basket, or a home run, and the disabled person cannot do
so? What if the disabled person misses every goal, every home run, and
most baskets? What is the point of going through an obstacle course to
get to the seat in the first place? As this article will discuss, this point is
far from irrelevant, in fact it is crucially important.
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Fortunately, a change has occurred in American society over the last
quarter century. Albeit slowly, attitudes towards the disabled have
changed, and attempts to bring the disabled into the whole of society
have taken greater meaning and importance. In the legal sphere, the pas-
sage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") in
19911 was a clear statutory step toward the emancipation of the dis-
abled. Among its many protections, the ADA prohibits discrimination
against the disabled in all places of public accommodation.2 This includes
sporting facilities and places of exercise or recreation. Title III of the Act
mandates that these protections apply to all places of public accommo-
dation, including sports stadiums and arenas.
So far, so good. Many would agree that it is high time that the dis-
abled partake in amusements that the able-bodied have taken for
granted. But what is the most appropriate way to permit such access?
How many seats must be reserved and where are they to be placed?
How much extra cost must the owner(s) absorb in designing a facility in
such a manner? As will be discussed, the courts are just beginning to
address these questions.
Let us return to our hypothetical. An owner of a basketball and
hockey franchise in a given city wishes to build a new arena. He or she
commissions architects to design a state-of-the-art sports palace, with all
the accouterments available for the patron, whether he or she is a high-
rolling corporate chieftain or a loyal fan of more modest means. The
place will be stacked with luxury boxes, club seating, and more standard
seating. Sure, it is expensive, but the owner is confident that the new
edifice will bring in all kinds of fans to watch his teams. The local politi-
cians back the idea, as the new palace, located in a previously impover-
ished or desolate area of the community, may create new jobs and
revitalize the area. Getting a few votes from these sports fan constitu-
ents will not hurt either.
At the time of construction, the owner, the commissioned architects,
and engineers wish to include the disabled in their facility. Aware of the
ADA, they fashion a facility that not only complies with the law and
accompanying regulations, but also serves the needs of a potential group
of fans heretofore shut out. Out of the 20,000 seats, the owner and the
architects debate how many should be accessible. Twenty percent? Ten
percent? A few hundred? They also consider where and how the seats
are to be distributed. The owner consults with his or her attorneys for
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1991).
2. Id. at § 12182(a).
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
guidance. But there is no conclusive answer. Like so many complex stat-
utes, much of the detail is left to administrative agencies to define and
regulate. If the agencies fail to promulgate effective and definable rules,
headaches will surely arise. And the ADA has given its share of head-
aches to employers, architects, and landlords in the few short years after
its enactment.3
This scenario is based on fact. The recent litigation involving the
construction of the newly opened MCI Arena in downtown Washington,
D.C., forced two federal Courts to address many of the concerns out-
lined. It also pitted the owner of the facility, his two teams, and the ar-
chitectural firm against a disabled rights organization and the Justice
Department. Other courts have also rendered decisions in this matter.
These rulings may have a major effect on the design of every stadium
and arena in the planning or construction stages for years to come.
First announced in 1994, the MCI Center was to accommodate 20,000
persons for basketball, hockey, concerts, and other entertainment
events.4 $150 million of private money was pledged for this project.5
The government of the District of Columbia endorsed the project for
economic and political reasons.6 One study reported that as a downtown
arena it would produce $152 million of commerce annually for the Dis-
trict of Columbia economy.7
Designed to replace the almost quarter-century old arena housing
the Washington Wizards (formerly the Bullets) of the NBA and the
Capitals of the NHL, the MCI Center is said to be one of the best facili-
ties of its kind, an ne-plus ultra state-of-the-art palace filled with all sorts
of amenities for the fans.' In a review just before its opening, the WASH-
INGTON POST recounted the difficulties of its construction and the gritti-
ness of Abe Pollin's (the owner of the arena and the NBA and NHL
teams which will be housed in the MCI Center) desire for this new
arena. Calling its construction a "huge challenge... a four-year strug-
gle, slowed for a half year by contaminated soil, a paralyzing snowstorm
3. See Fawn Germer, Rights Law Rubs Businessman Raw; Disability Act Widens Opportu-
nities For Millions But 7es Some Companies In Knots, RocKY MN. NEws, Oct. 15, 1996, at
3A; Pearl Bosco, The ADA Today, and Tomorrow, and Tomorrow?, BUMDINGS, Apr., 1994, at
62.
4. Brief for Appellants, Paralyzed Veterans, et al., v. Eflerbe Becket Architects & Engi-
neers, P.C., et al., Nos. 97-7005 & 97-7017, at 6 (D.C., May 9, 1997).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pollin Arena Proves a Winner with the Fans; Building Declared 'Impressive,' 'Great,'
'Bea.u-ti.ful,' WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1997, at A21.
[Vol. 8:263
WHEELING THROUGH ROUGH TERRAIN
and asbestos," one writer noted that it "by and large succeeds in its de-
sign" to "cultivate fist pumping excitement." 9 And Abe Pollin, the owner
of MCI Center and the Wizards and the Capitals said that he "had much
to be thankful for - most of all to the good lord for letting me see this
day."' 0
The MCI Center is but one of a number of arenas and stadiums
planned and constructed in this decade. Since 1992, new arenas have
opened in Boston, Buffalo, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Chicago. New
baseball and football stadiums have been completed, or are under con-
struction in Cleveland, Miami, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta. Planned
facilities in Milwaukee, Detroit, San Francisco, and Broward County
(FL) are in various stages of development. The ruling by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C.
Arena, L.P., attempted to clarify the standards for the construction of
disabled seating, setting a precedent for these future locales. But the
legal and procedural history left a bad taste in everyone's mouth, from
the plaintiff disabled advocates to the defendant owners and architects.
And courts in other jurisdictions have been skeptical about the reason-
ing behind the Court's conclusions. 2
This essay will describe the history of the case, the applicable ADA
regulations and their interpretations by both the District Court and the
D.C. Circuit, resulting in one of the most important and underpublicized
cases in this field in recent years. Analogous cases with conflicting rul-
ings from other circuits will also be discussed.
THE ADA AND ITS SIGHTLINE REGULATIONS
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to address what Congress found to be
a "serious and pervasive social problem... discrimination against individ-
uals with disabilities"" in public accommodations, employment, trans-
portation, and other areas of public life. The goal of this statute is "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
9. Thomas Heath & David Montgomery, Once More, the Ball Is in Pollin's Court, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 1997, at A01; Frank Ahrens, The Lights go Up - And Down, and Up - On the
Wizards' Palace, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1997, at D01.
10. Hillel Kuttler, Suddenly, Downtown D.C. Comes Alive, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 4,
1997, at 20.
11. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (In the lower court, the case was entitled Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).)
12. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or.
1997).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (1990).
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of discrimination against persons with disabilities."' 4 Title III of the Act
bans discrimination against person with disabilities by owners or opera-
tors of public accommodations, which include sports stadiums and are-
nas. The language is quite broad and general: "[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodations."' 5
The Act imposes greater requirements of access for facilities
designed and completed for "first occupancy" after January 26, 1990.16
Title III of the Act requires that the design must be "readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities.' 1 7 There is a strong presump-
tion that this goal must be achieved. The only exception is where meet-
ing this requirement is "structurally impracticable" which was defined by
the regulation to mean "those rare circumstances when the unique char-
acteristics of the terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility fea-
tures."" This exception is not applicable in the case of a new sports
arena.
The statute did not precisely define what is meant by "readily accessi-
ble and usable for individuals with disabilities."' 9 Instead it directed an
entity called the United States Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board (hereinafter "Board") to issue specific guidelines im-
plementing the ADA.20 This Board, made up of thirteen individuals ap-
pointed by the President, and representatives of twelve governmental
departments or agencies, issued recommendations to the Department
of Justice (hereinafter "DOJ") for consideration and adoption. The rec-
ommendations, called the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (hereinafter
"ADAAG")22  included a number of different implementation
recommendations.
In the construction of a sports facility, two of these guidelines come
into play. The first, ADAAG section 4.1.3(19) is relatively straightfor-
ward. It requires arenas which seat more than 500 persons, to have six
disabled access seats plus one for every hundred total seats in excess of
14. Id. at (b)(1).
15. Id. at § 12182(a).
16. Id. at § 12183(a)(1).
17. Id.
18. Id.; See also C.F.R. § 36.401(c).
19. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., et. al. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs P.C., et al,
950 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. D.C. 1996).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12204.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 792(a)(1) (1994).
22. They are codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A (1996).
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the first five hundred. Called the "one percent plus one" requirement, it
has become familiar to architects and builders and is one that has not
been controversial.23 However, section 4.33.3, which deals with the
placement of wheelchair locations has not been as simple or understand-
able. It provides: "Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed
seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical
disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to
those for members of the general public." 24 It also provides that "at least
one companion fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheelchair seat-
ing area. When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall
be provided in more than one location."'25
The language came from earlier regulations for federally-financed fa-
cilities.26 The term "lines of sight comparable" was not defined and its
scope is the key point in this litigation. In a nutshell, the issue is whether
this standard requires wheelchair seats to afford sightlines over standing
spectators.
In February 1991, one month after the Board issued section 4.33.3,
the DOJ sought to adopt the Board's guidelines as the accessibility stan-
dard.27 After a period of notice and comment, the standards were
adopted.28 The DOJ's "final" version of section 4.33.3 was identical to
the Board's earlier version.29
During the comment period, a number of commentators recom-
mended that the "lines of sight" standard should mean a "clear view"
over standing spectators. 3° Thus, if the non-disabled patrons in front of
the disabled patrons were to stand, the disabled patron, unable to stand,
could still see the action. When the Board first crafted its standard, it
considered this matter. In fact it solicited comments on "whether full
lines of sight over standing spectators.., should be required."'" When
the DOJ accepted the standard, it "omitted reference to the standing
spectator problem: it simply recommended, 'lines of sight comparable to
those available to the rest of public,' ,32 and deferred the issues of stand-
ing spectators. This resulted in an inconsistency between the Board's rec-
23. Id. at § 4.1.3(19).
24. Id. at § 4.33.3 (1996) (emphasis added).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Brief for Appellants, Nos. 97-7005 & 97-7017, at 4.
27. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 581.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 (1991).
31. Id.
32. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 581.
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ommendations and the DOJ's final regulation. Although both
regulations are worded exactly the same, this standing spectators issue
took on an important role.
Although the Board wished to address the issue of standing specta-
tors in a future report, the DOJ initially expressed no point of view. For-
tuitously, an interpretation against the notion of mandatory sightlines
over standing spectators appeared. In 1992, the Justice Department re-
jected the standing spectator interpretation. During a conference of Ma-
jor League Baseball stadium operators, the department's chief of the
Public Access section stated that " 'there is no requirement of line of
sight over standing spectators.' " But the following year, the DOJ's
interpretation began to change. By the middle of 1993, it began an inves-
tigation into the accessibility of stadium facilities for the 1996 Summer
Olympics, and first embraced the "standing spectator" (hereafter known
as enhanced sightlines) concept. 4 The result of the investigation was an
agreement to make Olympic Stadium (now Turner Field) "'the most ac-
cessible stadium in the world,' in part because 'virtually all wheelchair
seats would have a comparable 'line of sight,' so that wheelchair users
can still see the playing surface even when spectators in front of them
stand up during the event.' "
By the end of 1994, the DOJ "formally" adopted the enhanced sight-
lines standard, but in a backhanded way. It published, without any notice
or comment, a supplement to a Technical Assistance Manual (hereinaf-
ter "TAM") explicitly stating that wheelchair locations must have lines
of sight over standing spectators. These technical manuals, required
under Title III of the ADA,3 6 are meant to assist architects in the build-
ing of the arenas; they are not supposed to be a substitute for a notice in
the Federal Register.3 7 No explanation for this addition, or for the ulti-
mate change of heart by the DOJ was made.
By the time Pollin announced plans for the MCI Center, other cities
had progressed in constructing new facilities, such as the Fleet Center in
Boston (housing the basketball Celtics and hockey Bruins) and the
Marine Midland Arena in Buffalo (housing the Sabres hockey team).
And the DOJ made the standard its own. Just one month later, the
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at n.1.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3).
37. Id.
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Defendants began work on the MCI Center - located just five blocks
from the Justice Department.
It must be noted that Pollin and Ellerbe Becket intended to have
disabled seating at the MCI arena. The arena is designed to have two
main "bowls" of seating, comprising a lower and upper level. 18 Similar
to other such facilities, the seating bowls are designed to be reconfigured
for different types of events. The MCI Center has four such configura-
tions: for basketball, hockey, and two types of stages for concert events.
The capacity was set at 17,989 for basketball (of which 189 would be
wheelchair spaces), 17,240 for hockey (182 wheelchair spaces), 18,648 for
the larger staging (213 wheelchair spaces), and 16,249 for the smaller
stage events (165 wheelchair spaces).39 The actual numbers conform to
the one percent plus one standard required in section 4.1.33(19). These
wheelchair spaces were found in both the upper and lower bowls. 40 But
not all of those seats had enhanced sightlines over standing spectators.
In fact, only seventy-one of the seats for basketball and the larger stag-
ing, and forty-one seats for hockey had enhanced sightlines. Also, a
great number of these seats were found in the end zones of the arena.
Also, as the blueprints demonstrate, the seating was more evenly distrib-
uted in the upper bowl than in the lower, with those seats more concen-
trated in the center and sides.4' Some, but not all of the seats had lines of
sight over standing spectators.42
The Department never formally contacted Pollin or Ellerbe Becket
as construction began on October 18, 1995. The following year, however,
the Paralyzed Veterans of America (hereinafter "PVA"), a public inter-
est group representing disabled individuals, including veterans, who have
served in the armed forces, brought an action under the ADA claiming
violations of section 4.33.3.43
38. See for example Exhibits to Defendants' Plan Pursuant to the Court's Order of De-
cember 20, 1996, No. 96-1354 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1997).
39. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F. Supp. 397.
40. Id. The MCI Center also includes 109 suites, which are privately sold. Each of the
suites is designed with a wheelchair space in the second row of seating.
41. See Exhibits to Defendants' Plan Pursuant to the Court's Order of December 20,
1996, No. 96-1354 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1997) & Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Proposed Com-
pliance Plan, No. 96-1354 (Jan. 21, 1997). These plans can be ordered from the Clerk of U.S.
District Court, Washington, D.C., Attn: Copy Desk, (202) 273-0520. The final plans referred
to were completed on May 16, 1997.
42. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 582.
43. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Ellerbe Becket, No. 1:96CV01354 (D. D.C. filed June 14, 1996).
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The Plaintiffs, who also brought suit against the owners of the Fleet
Center in Boston, the Marine Midland Arena in Buffalo, and the Core-
States Center in Philadelphia, argued that the ADA mandates that all
disabled seating must have enhanced sightlines over standing spectators.
Basically, the PVA sought to modify the seating plan of the MCI Center,
not only to make all seats in such a manner, but to distribute the seating
more evenly.44
The Defendants claimed that because of the sightline requirement's
inconclusive history, a "nebulous record, comprised mostly of informal
documents, press releases, announcements and correspondence"45 re-
sulted. Therefore, they pointed out that there was no authoritative deter-
mination, either in the statute, or in the attorney general's regulations, or
in the advisory proposals, that this would be the case. Even though a
proposed draft in 1996 by the Access Board "suggested" that the Board
may be ready to interpret "comparable" as requiring enhanced sight-
lines, it did not take an official position.4 6 Throughout this time, the
arena was designed with the assumption that "enhanced sightlines" were
not required to any degree. Not unmindful of the problem caused by
non-disabled patrons standing, the Defendants proposed to withhold
from sale those seats in front of the wheelchair patrons and to impose an
"education and enforcement" policy which would discourage patrons
seated in front of wheelchair patrons from standing up during play. Signs
would be posted reminding patrons not to stand.47
THE DisTcRr COURT DECISION
The case was argued in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. Ellerbe Becket was dismissed from the case at that time,48 leaving
the MCI Center and Pollin's Limited Partnership as the remaining De-
fendants. On a summary judgment motion brought by the Defendants in
October, 1996, the Court, in a bench opinion, granted deference to the
DOJ's recent 1994 TAM interpretation of section 4.33.3 requiring en-
hanced sightlines, but did so reluctantly. Judge Thomas Hogan specifi-
cally criticized the government for not giving any expertise regarding its
interpretation. 49 He made this ruling despite the "good faith" of the De-
fendants in proceeding with its design and construction of the MCI
44. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F. Supp. at 404.
45. Id. at 399.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F.Supp. at 398.
49. Id. at 399.
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Center believing that the ADA had not required that the wheelchair
seating location must provide an enhanced sightline.5 ° With this issue
resolved, it was up to the Court to determine whether the MCI Center
complied with the ADA standards.
The second and more extensive ruling occurred two months later.51
Throughout this opinion, the lower Court was troubled with the adminis-
trative history of this case and stated some pointed criticism of the DOJ.
"The Justice Department has not established a clear record of exactly
what its interpretation requires. With the exception of a single, general
diagram in a 1996 'Accessible Stadiums' release [regarding the Atlanta
Olympic stadium], the Department has not defined or documented the
technical specifications for compliance.""2 It added, "[t]o further com-
plicate matters, the Department of Justice has not insisted on full com-
pliance"53 with the proposed line of sight standard, as demonstrated by
the fact that the DOJ came to a settlement in a dispute concerning the
Atlanta Olympic facilities which offered limited numbers of enhanced
sightline seating.54
Turning to the merits of the ruling, the Court concluded that the De-
fendants violated section 4.33.3 but in looking at the standards in a flexi-
ble manner, the Court did not conclude that every seat had to provide
enhanced sightlines 55 All that was required, said the Court, was a "sub-
stantial percentage of seats" providing these sightlines.56 In looking at
the designs, the numbers were not substantial, but could be modified
with "moderate changes to achieve compliance."57
In looking at the designs of the arena, the Court concluded that the
numerical requirements of section 4.1.3 were met and that the seating
was "sufficiently integrated" to meet the ADA's requirements." As for
the sightlines, the Court noted that seventy-one spaces for basketball,
seventy for hockey, seventy-one for the larger stage, and forty-one
spaces for the smaller stage met the requirement.5 9 In all, less than forty
percent of the wheelchair spaces provided unobstructed sightlines. The
question was what to do about the other seats. The Court looked to the
50. Id. at 389.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 399.
53. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F. Supp. at 399.
54. Id. at 399.
55. Id. at 401.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F. Supp. at 402.
59. Id.
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
two proposals advocated for the Defendants: the "no-stand" and "no-
sell" concepts.6 °
In rejecting both as unworkable, the Court made the following prac-
tical observations. The "no-stand" policy (euphemistically referred to as
the "educational and enforcement policy") would prevent persons from
standing up in front of wheelchair patrons to clear the line of sight.61
According to the Court, the solution was an "operational" rather than a
"design" solution, 62 thereby violative of the ADA's requirement that the
design and construction must provide the access.63 Also, the disabled
would be singled out for attention and possibly worse. The Court noted
that the defendants stated that they would not eject patrons for violating
the policy.64
One can imagine the following scenario: the Washington Capitals are
playing against the New York Rangers. A wheelchair patron, rooting for
the Rangers, asks the fans in front of him or her to stop standing because
it disrupts the line of sight. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure
out the probable result.
As to the "no-sell" policy, the Court considered that idea in a more
favorable light, since it was not merely an operational measure. The fact
that no one would sit in front of the wheelchair patron would ensure an
enhanced sightline and would prevent potential ugliness from result-
ing.65 Also, this was the solution approved by the Justice Department
for one of the venues of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. 66 Therefore, it con-
cluded that the "no-sell" policy could bring the non-enhanced line of
sight seats into compliance.67 Most of those seats were found in the up-
per bowl of the arena. With such a solution, seventy-two upper level
spaces would be brought into compliance, the Defendants would achieve
enhanced sightlines in seventy-nine percent of the basketball spaces, sev-
enty-seven percent of the larger stage spaces, eighty-two percent of the
hockey spaces, and sixty-two percent of the smaller stage spaces.6"
However, the Court ruled that even with this proposal, proper access
in the lower sections of the MCI Center would not be adequate.69 The
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F.Supp. at 402.
64. Id. at 403, n.21.
65. Id. at 403.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F. Supp. at 403, n.23.
69. Id. at 404-5.
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reason was the inadequate dispersal of the seats in the lower level of the
arena.71 Unlike the top level, which had adequate dispersal (as seating is
distributed equally throughout the bowl) and only needed to have en-
hanced sightlines, the lower level had almost no spaces in the center sec-
tions. The only enhanced sections were in the corners. As the Court
remarked "the spaces in the lower and club levels are ghettoized in the
end zone arenas."17 1  The Court concluded that the MCI Center, as
designed, was not "readily accessible to and usable by" wheelchair users
as required by the ADA.72 The Court required the Defendants to sub-
mit proposed changes in design within thirty days of the decision.73
Acceding to the Court's wishes, the Defendants submitted a revised
plan that increased the percentage of general seating wheelchair spaces
that have enhanced sightlines. For the upper deck seats, the MCI Center
would implement a "no-sale" policy to withhold from sale seats in a
prior row.74 For the lower bowl, the plan increased the number of front
row wheelchair spaces in the center area, but would not add any more
enhanced seating.75 The lower court rejected the revised seating plan. In
a two-page order, Judge Hogan ruled that the seating arrangement still
"does not comply with the ADA" because there were not enough en-
hanced view seats in the center Court area of the lower level.7 6 More
significantly, the Court concluded that the design did not provide seating
that was "sufficiently dispersed throughout the center court locations of
the Lower Bowl."'77 The Court did conclude that the rest of the arena's
seating tiers did comply with the ADA.78 The Court ordered that a new
plan be submitted within fifteen days.
The Defendants sought reconsideration of the first plan, or in the
alternative, a second compliance plan was offered, where a "roll-for-
ward" mechanism would be utilized to provide enhanced wheelchair
spaces in the center court area back from the playing surface.79 This
70. Id.
71. Id. at 404.
72. Id. at 405
73. Paralyzed Veterans, 950 F.Supp. at 405-6.
74. Defendants' Plan Pursuant to the Court's Order of December 20, 1996, No. 96-1354, at
3.
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. Order, Paralyzed Veterans of America, et al., v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engr., et
al., Civ. No. 96-1354, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1997).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Reconsideration Or, In The Alterna-
tive, For Acceptance For First Amended Plan, Civ. 96-1354 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 28, 1997) (The
Defendants claimed that the enhanced line of sight standard was improperly applied and the
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plan was also denied by the lower court and ultimately the defendants
and plaintiffs appealed.80
THE APPELLATE RULING
On July 1, 1997, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously af-
firmed the lower Court decision.8 Of central importance was the "doc-
trinal" issue of whether the regulations can be enforced in the manner
required by the lower court and by extension, the appellees.
The opinion by Judge Silberman, writing for the panel (also com-
posed of Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Sentelle), had to consider
what was meant by "lines of sight" and the level of deference to be given
to the DOJ's interpretation. The panel noted that the term "comparable
lines of sight" is by no means obvious.8 2 "[T]here is no indication" the
Court said "that the words were intended to address sightlines over
standing spectators," but "neither is there any evidence to the con-
trary."83 Since the words do not have an accepted meaning, the panel
reasoned that the ambivalence lends credence to the notion that the in-
terpretation of the phrase by the DOJ should be entitled to deference.8"
The issue of deference goes to the heart of administrative law, and
the next portion of the panel's decision presents a textbook discussion of
this area of law. It is a bedrock maxim that an agency's determination of
administrative regulations is afforded deference by the courts, unless
they are "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the regulation.85 The
Court addressed the arguments of several academics who have called
into question this standard.86 Although the D.C. Circuit panel rejected a
new approach to administrative regulation, it noted that there was "an
outer limit to that deference imposed by the Administrative Procedure
Act ["APA"]." 8 7 "It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate
mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal
'interpretations.' "88 However, the Court emphasized that section 4.33.3
Plaintiffs cross-appealed because the injunction did not require all wheelchair locations to
have enhanced views).
80. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F. 3d at 582.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 583.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 584.
86. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996).
87. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F. 3d at 584.
88. Id.
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is not that type of regulation. Though section 4.33.3 was drafted by the
Access Board, not the DOJ, the fact that it was adopted by the Justice
Department thus made it the Department's responsibility.8 9 More sig-
nificantly, since Congress required the publication of a technical manual
that would "further refine or interpret" the regulation's obligations, the
fact that the= manual was issued "contemplate[s] a continuing administra-
tion of the regulation."90 Therefore, it reasoned that the manual must be
given deference.
The Court discussed the Appellants' most compelling argument: that
this interpretation of the regulation constituted a "fundamental modifi-
cation of its previous interpretation."91 It is a foundation of administra-
tive law that once the agency gives its interpretation to a regulation, it
can only modify that regulation through a process of notice and com-
ment rulemaking under the APA.92 But the question remained whether
the change in the interpretation of the phrase "lines of sight compara-
ble" was such a modification requiring the formal procedures. The panel
concluded - barely - that it did not.93
In one sense, the Court rejected the government's argument that
even if the initial interpretation is forwarded by the government, it can
decide to change the interpretation of an ambiguous interpretation as
long as the "regulation reasonably will bear" the newer meaning.94 That
Court rejected this broad claim. The APA makes it clear that notice and
comment is obligatory before formulating regulations and amend-
ments.95 However, in this case, the central point was whether section
4.33.3 was "amended" or fundamentally modified by the enhanced sight-
lines interpretation.
"[A]ppellants almost but do not quite establish that the Department
significantly changed its interpretation of the regulation when it issued
the 1994 technical manual," the opinion stated.96 It concluded "that the
Department never authoritatively adopted a position contrary to its
manual interpretation" before any modification or change occurred.97
Since it never released an "official" interpretation of the lines of sight
89. Id. at 585.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
93. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586.
94. Id
95. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
96. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 587.
97. Id.
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issue, the Court deemed that no prior determination was made.98 The
prior inconsistent statements about the scope of the regulations were not
treated as definitive, despite any confusion that these activities might
have caused the owners of the MCI Arena.
Still, appellants argued that prior statements made by the deputy
chief of the Public Access Section of the Civil Rights Division of the
DOJ made to baseball stadium operators that denied an enhanced sight-
line were prior official determinations. "A speech of a mid-level official
of an agency.. .is not the sort of 'fair and considered judgment' that can
be thought of as an authoritative departmental position."99 The opinion
added that it is not equivalent to the TAM issued beforehand. As a
result, the enhanced sightlines standard was deemed to be the first time
that the department had made a judgment on the issue.10 And since the
manual interpretation was not sufficiently distinct or "additive" to the
regulation, there was no notice and comment requirement necessary.10'
On cross-appeal, the appellees claimed that the lower court erred in
not requiring all wheelchair seating to comply with the enhanced sight-
lines requirement.' The D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's "substan-
tiality" standard of eighty percent as sufficient.0 3 Rejecting the
argument that the lower court erroneously refused to accept an amicus
brief from the DOJ, in which the government argued that "substantial
compliance" should only apply to limited circumstances where full com-
pliance is "impractical," the appellate panel ruled that the lower court
had no obligation to accept this brief, especially due to the government's
prior lack of interest in the case. 10 4
The D.C. Circuit had the final word, since a certiorari petition to the
United States Supreme Court was ultimately denied. 5 As the first ap-
pellate decision to interpret the scope of section 4.33.3, the case was a
victory for the disabled, though a controversial one. Both the District
Court and the D.C. Circuit were clearly upset at the government's action
or lack thereof, despite the deference given by those Courts to the DOJ.
Because of the questionable procedural history, the precedential value
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 589.
104. Id.
105. Pollin, et al., v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., et al., 118 S.Ct. 1184 (1998); See also
Maryann Haggerty, Ruling on Handicapped Access at MCI Is Affirmed, WASH. Posr, Mar. 10,
1998, at E01.
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of the case may not carry to other circuits. If other courts are equally or
more upset, and opine that such deference should not apply here, is
there a chance for a contrary interpretation?
OTHER ARENA AccEss CASES
In late 1996, after eight months of unsuccessful negotiations, the DOJ
filed suit in Minneapolis against Ellerbe Becket under the ADA, alleging
that the firm engaged in a pattern of violation in its construction plans
for sports arenas.1 6 The suit asked the Court to bar the firm from de-
signing any new stadiums and to assess a civil penalty not in excess of
$50,000.1°7 The lawsuit cited Boston's Fleet Center, the CoreStates
Center in Philadelphia, the Rose Garden in Portland, Gund Arena in
Cleveland, Marine Midland Arena in Buffalo, and the MCI Center as
examples of this "pattern" by Ellerbe Beckett.'08 The complaint alleged
that "patrons confined to wheelchairs have no place to sit that guaran-
tees a line of sight to the playing surface."'0 9
Ellerbe Becket sought dismissal, claiming that architects are ex-
cluded from liability under Title III of the ADA as a matter of law, and
in addition claiming non-meritorious defenses such as lack of stand-
ing."0 After rejecting the standing issue, the Court addressed the other
claims, including the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3. Relying on
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Paralyzed Veterans, the Ellerbe Becket court
denied the motion, concluding that the enhanced sightlines standard was
entitled to deference."' In effect, the latter court gave collateral estop-
pel effect to the D.C. Circuit ruling, despite, as will be discussed, deci-
sions to the contrary. It also affirmed the Paralyzed Veterans district
court's holding that "substantial compliance with [the] standard" does
not mean one hundred percent enhanced lines of sight." 2
As to other arguments, the Court in Ellerbe Becket concluded that
section 303(a) of the ADA applies to architects, since it concerns "own-
ers, operators, lessors or lessees of public accommodations,""' and not
106. See United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc. 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D.C. D. Minn.
1997).
107. David Halbfinger, U.S. Sues FleetCenter Designers; Claims Failure to Provide Lines
of Sight for Disabled, Bos. GLOBE, October 11, 1996, at C3.
108. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1265, n.2.
109. Lorraine Woellert, U.S. Sues Arena Designer Under Disability Law, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1996, at B9.
110. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1264-66.
111. Id. at 1266.
112. Id. at 1269.
113. Id. at 1267.
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designers of "commercial facilities.""' 4 In rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that Congress "clearly intended" that commercial facilities
be subject to the accessibility standards for new construction.115
More recently, Ellerbe Becket and the DOJ entered into a consent
order whereby the firm agreed to design future arenas (those after the
date of the consent order) with the enhanced sightlines standard so that
"all or substantially all of the wheelchair seating locations in the facility
provide lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general
public. ' 116 For projects already completed, the government agreed not
to commence any enforcement actions. 17
Two recent opinions by federal courts in differing circuits have called
the Paralyzed Veterans rationale into serious question, setting a stage for
a battle over the scope and effect of the enhanced sightlines require-
ment. A district court in New Jersey issued a contrary opinion in Caruso
v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Center."8 While there are
some distinguishing features between the facts in this case and those in
Paralyzed Veterans, the skepticism of the government's interpretation by
the judge is telling and worth analyzing.
Caruso involved the construction of a music and entertainment facil-
ity in Camden, New Jersey, which accommodates up to 25,000 people." 9
Plaintiffs, a disabled patron and a disabled rights group, sued shortly af-
ter the facility opened in May 1995, claiming, among other grounds, vio-
lations of the enhanced sightlines standard.120 This court looked at the
confused history of section 4.33.3 in a more skeptical manner than both
of the Paralyzed Veterans' Courts (which had their own doubts about the
viability of the enhanced sightlines standard).
First, the Caruso court noted important factual differences between
the cases. In Paralyzed Veterans, the Defendants had notice of the 1994
114. Id.
115. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267.
116. Consent order, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Civil Action No. 4-96-995 (D.C. D.
Minn, Apr. 27, 1998). See also Mark Conrad, "Disabled-Seat Pact May Unify Standard for
New Stadiums," N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1998, at 5. This order, announced on April 27, 1998, as this
article was going to press may have a significant effect on future stadium and arena designs.
Although it only applies to Ellerbe Becket, other firms may use this as an industry-wide stan-
dard, but it is too early to know for sure. Id.
117. The order also includes detailed measurements for the average heights of standing
spectators and the average height of a person in a wheelchair to be used in calculating sight
lines for the disabled. Ellerbe Becket, No. 4-96-995.
118. 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997).
119. Id. at 212, n.4.
120. Id. at 210.
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TAM supplemental interpretation before planning began, where as in
Caruso, no such notice occurred because the facility began its planning
and construction earlier."2' Also, in Paralyzed Veterans, the MCI Center
was in the design stage, rendering accommodations much less costly than
for the Sony Theater, which had already been built.'22
If the court had stopped there, the effect of Caruso would be minimal
as the inference would be that any "new" facility in planning or design
stages would be distinguished from the Caruso facts. In other words, it
would be a backhanded endorsement of the Paralyzed Veterans rulings.
But the Caruso court did not stop at this safe harbor. It continued its line
of reasoning, viewing the TAM determination as akin to a "legislative
rule" which required a formal notice and comment stage rather than an
"interpretative rule," which did not."z In disagreeing with the District
Court's rationale in Paralyzed Veterans, the Caruso court found that the
TAM provision was "an improperly promulgated substantive rule that
conflicts with existing regulations and deserves little deference."'2 4
The court also found that "the notice and comment requirements of
the APA cannot be evaded by merely interpreting an existing regulation
to cover subject matter consciously omitted from its scope."'" And in
disregarding the enhanced sightlines interpretation of section 4.33.3, as
"irrational" given the lack of legislative history and defectively promul-
gated revision of an existing rule, the court concluded that "it was clear
from the public record that the concept of comparable lines of sight had
not been interpreted to include enhanced sightlines,"'' 6 an interpreta-
tion consistent since 1984.
THE RosE GARDEN CASE
The most recent case in the saga of disabled access to arenas ad-
dresses the issues of lines of sight, and novel "second generation issues"
applied to disabled patrons. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon
Arena Corporation, 7 is the most exhaustive and detailed ruling ren-
dered since MCI and may set the stage for appellate reviews as well as
future litigation in the field. It exhaustively analyzed the ADA in its ap-
plication of the legal standards and scope of administrative review.
121. Id. at 215, n.10.
122. Id.
123. Caruso, 968 F. Supp. at 215, n.10.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
127. Independent Living Resources, 982 F.Supp. 698.
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A Portland, Oregon attorney brought an action against the Oregon
Arena Corporation, the builder and owner of the Rose Garden, alleging
violations of the ADA. 2 The principal tenants of the arena are the
National Basketball Association's Portland Trail Blazers and a minor
league hockey team. The plaintiff claimed that the arena was engaged in
a pattern of discrimination due to the location of the wheelchair spaces
and the lack of adequate sightlines to see the events.129 Each party
sought summary judgment. 3
The motion gave the Court room to determine a number of issues
about enhanced sightlines and other disabled access issues. First, the
Court ruled that the placement of the 191 wheelchair seats did not pro-
vide for adequate disbursal, because the seats were concentrated in the
upper level of the arena.' 3 ' It noted that subtracting the "excess" spaces
in the upper level, the arena violated the "one percent plus one" stan-
dard of the ADA rules. 32 It also concluded, much like the lower court
in Paralyzed Veterans, that the wheelchair spaces were improperly "clus-
tered" into the corners of the end zones, lacking uniform distribution. 33
Calling this "scheme [a] far cry from exact or even rough proportional-
ity" the court noted that eighty-two percent of the Rose Garden's wheel-
chair spaces are clustered in those locations. 34
The court saved the greatest amount of discussion for the scope of
the sightlines. The plaintiffs argued that the arena was required to pro-
vide patrons with a line of sight over standing spectators, under section
4.33.3, citing both Paralyzed Veterans and the DOJ's interpretation (the
DOJ was an amicus party in this case).135 But the court divided this
question into three distinct issues: (1) whether DOJ could require that
wheelchair users be provided with a line of sight over standing specta-
tors; (2) whether such a requirement actually does exist and whether it is
binding upon this defendant; and (3) whether defendant has any equit-
able defense to the enforcement of such a requirement. 36
After answering the first question in the affirmative, with little real
debate as to the ample legal authority to support such a requirement, 37
128. Id.
129. Id. at 706.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 708.
132. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp.. at 708.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 714.
135. Id. at 709.
136. Id. at 732-58.
137. Independent Living Resource, 982 F. Supp. at 734.
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the Court analyzed the latter two matters. The question of whether the
1994 TAM supplement was a valid "interpretation regulation" was, of
course, addressed in both Paralyzed Veterans and Caruso with different
results. The Court looked to both cases for guidance on the matter and
its conclusion was striking.138 In following Caruso, the court could have
relied upon the fact that the date on which construction occurred was
before the TAM supplement had been published.'3 9 But the Court did
not follow this reasoning, instead it analyzed the administrative law as-
pects in a manner almost worthy of a heightened scrutiny analysis. Con-
cluding that it is "irrelevant whether defendant was aware of DOJ
interpretation prior to the date when construction of the Rose Garden
commenced,"' 4 ° the Court rejected the idea advocated in Paralyzed Vet-
erans, that the 1994 TAM supplement was a valid interpretation regula-
tion.14 1 The question was "not whether [the DOJ] privately reached a
different interpretation of standard 4.33.3 than the one the agency now
articulates, but whether it had formally and publicly adopted such a con-
trary interpretation."'142
Unlike the D.C. Circuit in Paralyzed Veterans, the Court in Oregon
Arena did not accept the notion that the DOJ's lack of adoption of
guidelines from the Access Board was independent from the commenta-
ries and viewpoints of the Board. 43 If the DOJ wished to adopt the
enhanced lines of sight standard, then, the court stated, it should have
published a separate commentary to satisfy notice and comment require-
ments.144 The DOJ never responded to public comments regarding indi-
vidual standards, nor did it explain why it had adopted the ADAAG rule
while rejecting its comments, specifically its failure to adopt an enhanced
sightlines standard. 45 In other words, if the ADAAG rule never author-
ized enhanced sightines, it was not within the DOJ's power to do so.
The opinion added that the enhanced lines of sight standard could not be
inferred from the general non-discriminatory language of the ADA
itself.14
6
138. Id. at 734-47.
139. Id. at 735.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 736-37.
142. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 737.
143. Id. at 742.
144. Id. at 743.
145. Id. at 741.
146. Id. at 743.
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In anticipation of a contrary result after a likely appeal, the district
court did admit that if a higher court decided that the TAM was a valid
interpretative regulation, or that a line of sight requirement may be en-
forced directly under the ADA, then the Defendants must comply with
the enhanced sightlines requirement and no defense, equitable or other-
wise, to this standard would be available. 47
Additionally, the ruling noted that the Rose Garden's executive
suites are public accommodations under the ADA and must fully comply
with the ADA design standards.'48 The court also concluded that money
damages are not awardable and that there was no evidence of a "pat-
tern" of ADA violations at the Rose Garden.' 49
The Court in Oregon Arena covered much administrative law terri-
tory and discussed many more disabled access issues than any prior deci-
sion on the matter. While excruciatingly detailed, it looked into the
interplay of administrative rulemaking and the flaws of the DOJ in
adopting the enhanced sightlines standard. Additionally, the Court ven-
tured into an issue that may signal a second generation of cases involving
disabled access.
THE SELLOUT FACTOR
Tickets for certain sports teams are often difficult to obtain and, not
surprisingly, many sports events result in sellouts. Think of the New
York Giants football team (with a decade-plus long waiting list for sea-
son tickets) or the Detroit Red Wings ice hockey team (with a 101 per-
cent capacity of fans, meaning that some may return tickets for
resale).' 50 Let us say that a team moves to a new arena, with approxi-
mately the same number of seats as the old one. And let us suppose that
season ticket holders buy up all or nearly all of the seating in the new
arena. Assuming that all, or just about all, of these ticketholders are
able-bodied, how is it possible to make the arena disabled-accessible?
Do the owners sacrifice some ticket holders' locations to make way for
proportional spacing of disabled seats? And what if those wheelchair ar-
eas are only available if season-ticket holders do not populate those
areas?
147. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 747.
148. Id. at 758.
149. Id. at 773.
150. William Rhoden, The Battle of New York, a Sad and Soggy Tale, N.Y. Thvms, Sep. 22,
1996, at C1.
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The thought of creating space for the disabled when the space may
not be there opens up a new Pandora's box of issues. For the first time,
the Court in Oregon Arena addressed them. Apparently the Court noted
that the Defendants had a policy of "infilling the wheelchair locations
with portable tiers of conventional seats for use by ambulatory pa-
trons."'' For Trail Blazers games, at least 133 of the wheelchair (and
companion) seats were infilled with 1028 conventional seats! This
amounted to about $50,000 in ticket revenue for each game, or about $2
million per season and no doubt is a powerful incentive to infill seats for
every game.
Section 4.33.3 permits "readily removable seats to be installed in
wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to accommodate
wheelchair users."'15 2 Since the "vast" majority of tickets for Trail Blaz-
ers games were sold on a season-ticket basis, and few were left for indi-
vidual games, the availability of disabled seating was minimal, prompting
the Court to note that "most wheelchair locations in the Rose Garden
exist only on paper, having been infilled with conventional seats and sold
to ambulatory patrons on a season ticket or longer basis.' 5 3s That figure
came to eighty-four percent of the wheelchair seats not located on the
very top level of the arena.'- 4 Noting the "disparate impact" of this pol-
icy, the Court opined that the "ticket sale and operational policies fur-
nish defendants with a powerful economic incentive to discourage
wheelchair use."' 55
Paralyzed Veterans did not consider this matter and it may not be as
much of a factor if the new arena has (1) considerably more seats than
the facility it replaces and /or (2) ticket demand is not high enough to
sellout matches. But if disabled patrons are adversely affected by long-
term ticketholders priorities, there is little question that this issue will
appear in future cases. And, much like other "disparate impact" cases
151. Independant Living Resources, 928 F.Supp. at 717.
152. 28. C. F. R. Pt. 36.
153. Independent Living Resources, 982 F.Supp. at 719.
154. Id. at 719. (David Snowden, Manager, Disabled Services from New York's Madison
Square Garden, a facility built and renovated before the 1993 date, told Edna Williams (Prof.
Conrad's research assistant) that the "majority" of the time MSG was able to accommodate
all requests for disabled seating at MSG events, but he said that the availability of disabled
seating mirrored the availability for the general population. For instance if the New York
Knicks face the Chicago Bulls, the general population seating tends to sell out, as does the
disabled seating, but they still try to accommodate the disabled as much as possible. Tele-
phone conversation between David Snowden and Edna Williams, Jan. 22, 1998.)
155. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 722
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and past Court remedies in the employment discrimination sphere, the
results either way could have some ugly effects.
CONCLUSION
The issue of proper access by the disabled to sports venues is in a
confused state. To many disabled patrons, the ADA has not yet accom-
plished its goal for effective access to sports arenas. But, to paraphrase
Shakespeare, the fault is not as much in the architects, engineers and
owners, as in the government's methods of promulgating a regulation.
Although the Court in Paralyzed Veterans upheld an enhanced sightlines
standard, it had to jump through some administrative law hoops to do so.
The DOJ's failure to convincingly define its regulations because of its
failure to institute formal notice and comment standards gives everyone
involved in the Paralyzed Veterans, Ellerbe Becket, Caruso, and Oregon
Arena cases unneeded headaches. That failure, under a law that in itself
will not win any awards for clarity and its tardy involvement, spawned
these, and potentially other lawsuits, and resulted in three contradictory
rulings by three different federal circuits.156
The goals of the ADA as exemplified in section 4.33.3 are certainly
noble. Disabled patrons have a right to enjoy going to an arena and
viewing a sporting event just like other members of society. For too long,
they have been pushed to the fringes of society and the time has come to
change this phenomenon. When sitting in an area, an enhanced sightline
is more than just an abstract concept. It is desirable, even necessary, to
give a wheelchair-seated patron a relatively full view of the events.
The recent settlement between Ellerbe Becket and the DOJ may en-
sure some stability to a standard that should have been adequately delin-
eated in the first place. But if not, because of the prior inconsistent
actions of the DOJ, it will take a higher court, possibly the United States
Supreme Court, to resolve the confusion regarding the proper standard
for sightline views. And then, as the Oregon Arena case demonstrates,
156. The PVA brought class action suits against the owners of the FleetCenter (Boston),
CoreStates Center (Philadelphia), the Marine Midland Arena (Buffalo), and the MCI Center,
in May and June of 1996, alleging that the seating designs of these facilities violated the ADA.
In the complaints involving the Marine Midland Arena and the MCI Center, the architects,
Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers, were included. See for example East. Paralyzed Vet-
erans Assoc. v. Crossroads Arena, L.L.C., et al., No. 96 CV 0102A(F) (W.D. New York). At
this time, the lawsuit against the Marine Midland Arena in Buffalo has been settled. Conver-
sation with Lawrence Hagel, Esq., of the PVA, February 10, 1998. In Boston, suit has been
filed but no action has been taken. Id Also at this time, Abe Pollin has petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in relation to the MCI Center lawsuits. Pollin,
118 S.Ct. 1184.
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that may be just the first of a myriad of issues in this field of disability
access.

